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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether sell-side analysts fully incorporate into their earnings forecasts the 
joint effects between accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of 
current earnings. Our results indicate that sell-side analysts do not fully incorporate such effects 
when they forecast future earnings so that they overestimate (underestimate) future earnings when 
current earnings are inflated (depressed) by those effects. Thus, we conclude that sell-side 
analysts do not recognize fully the joint effects between accounting conservatism and real activity 
on the earnings quality and that they need to mitigate their bias to enhance market efficiency by 
providing investors with a good benchmark for their earnings expectation. 
 
Keywords: Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts; Earnings Quality; Market Efficiency 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper examines whether sell-side analysts fully incorporate into their earnings forecasts the effects 
of interaction between accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of 
current earnings. Penman and Zhang (2002) demonstrate that investors do not fully recognize the 
varying quality of current earnings, arising from the joint effect of accounting conservatism and changes in real 
investment, when they forecast future earnings. This evidence implies that the market valuations can be biased, at 
least, in a short term, since investors value firms without fully appreciating the quality of current earnings. Given the 
market’s mispricing of earnings quality, it is worthwhile to evaluate the factors which might mitigate or exacerbate 
the market’s mispricing. This is because the stock market’s pricing errors, i.e., the stock price’s deviation from the 
intrinsic value of equity, could substantially impede the efficient allocation of resources among competing stocks. 
Given that sell-side analysts are the most prominent information intermediaries in the capital market, we investigate 
whether they identify and communicate information about the quality of current earnings with investors.  
 
Our research builds largely on the seminal study by Penman and Zhang (2002). Penman and Zhang (2002) 
is unique in examining how accounting methods affect the quality of reported earnings. Most of the existing studies 
related to this subject stress that the quality of earnings depends highly on the changes in accounting methods or 
estimates (Healy 1985; Beaver and Engel 1996; Moehrle 2002). Penman and Zhang (2002), on the other hand, argue 
that the quality of earnings can be affected by the interaction between permanent choice of accounting methods and 
changes in real investment, not merely by changes in accounting methods or estimates. Specifically, using their own 
constructed index of accounting conservatism (C-score) and earnings quality (Q-score), they empirically show that 
conservative accounting coupled with temporary changes in real investment does affect the quality of current 
earnings. Furthermore, Penman and Zhang (2002) demonstrate that investors fail to fully appreciate the effects of 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of current earnings, which leads to the 
market’s mispricing.  
T 
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Our study extends their study by exploring whether sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts fully incorporate 
such effects. So far, many accounting literature has been interested in the efficiency of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and has provided mixed results on whether they can function as a signal for the market’s mispricing (e.g., 
Abarbanell 1991; Stickel 1991; Gleason and Lee 2003; Liu 2003; Gunny 2005). However, all of these studies 
examine the analysts’ ability to recognize fully the effects of accounting method choice or the effects of real activity 
on earnings quality individually, not simultaneously. Hence, this void of previous literature motivates us to examine 
whether analysts’ earnings forecasts can facilitate investors to better understand the effects of interaction between 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of current earnings. 
 
To address this issue, we empirically examine the association between analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
and the index (i.e. Q score) of quality of current earnings. If analysts fully incorporate the quality of current 
earnings, which relates to the effect of interaction between accounting conservatism and changes in real investment 
on future earnings, analysts’ earnings forecast errors should not be associated with the index of quality of current 
earnings. Using the U.S. data for the fiscal years of 1985-2008, however, we find a significant association between 
analysts’ earnings forecasts errors and the index of earnings quality. This result indicates that sell-side analysts do 
not fully incorporate the quality of current earnings affected by the joint effect of accounting conservatism and 
changes in real investment on future earnings when they forecast future earnings. It implies that investors cannot 
fully mitigate their mispricing of such an effect by using analysts’ earnings forecast as the benchmark for their 
earnings expectation.  
 
This study contributes to the growing body of evidence relating to the efficiency of analysts’ earnings 
forecast. Although prior research has accumulated abundant evidence with respect to the efficiency of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, none of these studies examine analysts’ ability to incorporate the joint effect of permanent 
accounting policy (accounting conservatism) and changes in real activity (changes in real investment) on the quality 
of current earnings. Thus, our study may promote investors’ assessment of the usefulness or limitation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts when investors make their own earnings expectation1. This study also supplements the findings 
provided by Penman and Zhang (2002). Our evidence suggests that even professional financial intermediaries, who 
may have superior ability to interpret accounting information, do not fully incorporate the joint effect of accounting 
conservatism and changes in real investment on future earnings. Thus, our evidence reinforces the previous findings 
that investors do not appear to fully understand how accounting conservatism and changes in real investment jointly 
affect the quality of current earnings.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes related studies and 
develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our research method and sample selection. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The question of whether investors fully appreciate the implication of current earnings on future earnings 
when predicting future earnings is a matter of primary concern to accounting policy makers as well as academic 
researchers. A number of literature suggests that investors do not fully appreciate the implication of current earnings 
on future earnings when predicting future earnings (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Sloan 1996; Xie 2001). These findings 
can be viewed as one of the most prominent pieces of evidence which establish the phenomenon of market 
inefficiency. Note that these studies are mainly characterized by focusing on the earnings quality which is affected 
by the changes in accounting methods or estimates (Collins and Hribar 2000; Richardson et al. 2005; Thomas and 
Zhang 2002; Pincus et al. 2007). For example, if the changes in estimates of bad debts or loan loss reserves are 
temporary, current earnings are of poor quality since this temporary effect reverses soon. In this line of reasoning, 
                                                
1 On the one hand, various previous studies provide the evidence which supports the analysts’ ability to lessen the market’s mispricing (e.g., 
Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Frankel and Lee 1998; Lee et al. 1999; Ali et al. 2003). These studies, as a whole, demonstrate that a significant 
portion of the market’s mispricing arises from the investors who are not able to incorporate fully information contents contained in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. On the other hand, a number of literature provides the evidence which indicates the inefficiency of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(e.g., Stober 1992; Ababanell and Bushee 1997; Easterwood and Nutt 1999). Thus, whether analysts’ earnings forecasts can function as an 
effective mechanism to mitigate the market inefficiency is still an open empirical question. 
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current earnings seem to become more sustainable and so be of high quality when consistent accounting methods or 
estimates are applied.  
 
Penman and Zhang (2002), however, substantially differ from this line of research by suggesting that the 
concerns on earnings quality still remain even when firms apply an accounting principle consistently. They show 
that even if firms implement conservative accounting permanently without changing accounting methods or 
estimates, temporary changes in real investment coupled with conservative accounting significantly affects the 
quality of current earnings. More specifically, conservative accounting reduces current earnings because it 
recognizes investment as expenses more than do the normal accounting. So, it builds up “hidden reserve” (hereafter, 
“reserve”) that might have been booked as assets under less conservative accounting and would be reported as 
profits when the growth of investment slows or investment declines. This phenomenon can arise from any 
application of conservative accounting. For example, LIFO inventory method produces higher cost of goods sold 
and lowers earnings, creating reserves, than FIFO inventory method. The recognition of R&D and advertisement 
expenses has similar effects on current earnings. That is, under conservative accounting, increase in real investment 
leads to lower current earnings than the ones which might have been reported by less conservative accounting, while 
it leads to higher future earnings. If the change in real investment is temporary, the resulting change in current 
earnings is also temporary and thus the current earnings become of low quality. Therefore, Penman and Zhang 
(2002) conclude that earnings quality can be affected by the interaction between conservative accounting and the 
change of real activity, as well as by the changes in accounting methods or estimates.  
 
Furthermore, Penman and Zhang (2002) suggest that investors do not fully incorporate the joint effect of 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on future earnings when predicting future earnings. Since 
investors fixate on current earnings, without incorporating fully such an effect, stock price deviates from the 
intrinsic value of equity. Given that the market’s mispricing of current earnings severely threatens the economically 
efficient allocations of resources in the capital market, it is of primary importance to assess which factors might 
mitigate or exacerbate the market’s mispricing. Accordingly, we examine whether sell-side analysts fully 
incorporate into their earnings forecasts the effects of interaction between accounting conservatism and changes in 
real investment on the quality of current earnings.  
 
Given the prominent role of sell-side analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, many 
research pays great attention to whether analysts’ earnings forecasts can mitigate the market inefficiency. On the one 
hand, various studies provide the evidence which supports the analysts’ ability to lessen the market’s mispricing 
(e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Frankel and Lee 1998; Lee et al. 1999; Ali et al. 2003). For example, Elgers et 
al. (2003) conclude that analysts’ earnings forecasts are less biased than investors’ earnings expectation in 
interpreting accruals. Also, Gunny (2005) suggests that analysts recognize the future earnings implications of 
earnings manipulation through the change of real activities while investors do not. These studies, as a whole, 
demonstrate that a significant portion of the market’s mispricing arises from the investors who are not able to 
incorporate fully information contents contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
On the other hand, a number of literature provides the evidence which indicates the inefficiency of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (e.g., Stober 1992; Ababanell and Bushee 1997; Easterwood and Nutt 1999). Ababanell 
and Bushee (1997) suggest that analysts’ forecast revisions fail to impound fully all the information about future 
earnings contained in the fundamental signals. Bradshaw et al. (2001) suggest that analysts do not fully incorporate 
the lower earnings quality associated with higher accruals into their earnings forecasts. Also, Kang and Yoo (2007) 
argue that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more biased than the market’s earnings expectation in interpreting 
accruals, which is contradictory to Elgers et al. (2003). Moreover, another set of studies examines the effect of 
accounting conservatism on analysts’ earnings forecasts errors (Mensah et al. 2004; Louis et al. 2008; Pae and 
Thornton 2010). These studies provide consistent evidence that analysts’ earnings forecasts errors are systematically 
associated with the level of conservative accounting. These results can be interpreted as analysts forecast future 
earnings as if they do not fully understand the implications of conservative accounting for future earnings. 
 
Collectively, prior literature presents mixed results on whether analysts’ earnings forecasts can function as 
an effective mechanism to mitigate the market inefficiency. This line of research, however, examines only analysts’ 
ability to recognize the effect of accounting conservatism and real activity on future earnings individually. 
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Correspondingly, the question of whether analysts fully incorporate into their earnings forecasts the effect of 
interaction between accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of current earnings 
remains unexplored.  
 
Thus, we examine whether analysts’ earnings forecast errors are systematically associated with the quality 
of current earnings affected by the interaction between conservative accounting and changes in real investment. 
Following Penman and Zhang (2002), we construct C-score as the level of estimated reserves created by the 
conservative accounting relative to net operating assets. We measure the estimated reserves as the unrecorded net 
assets resulting from using LIFO inventory method, R&D expensing and advertising expenditures. Penman and 
Zhang (2002) suggest that the change in estimated reserves relative to net operating assets captures the joint effect of 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of current earnings. So, in order to measure 
the earnings quality, we construct the earnings quality index, i.e., the Q-score, as the change of C-score. Penman and 
Zhang (2002) empirically show that the Q-score has the ability to identify the effects of interaction between 
accounting conservatism and temporary change in real investment on current and future earnings, suggesting that the 
Q-score is an appropriate measure to capture the quality of earnings. More specifically, they show that a relatively 
higher (lower) Q-score implies current earnings that are lower (higher) than that expected in the future.  
 
Our empirical hypothesis with respect to the association between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors and the 
Q-score is straightforward. We hypothesize that analysts’ earnings forecasts reveal a greater pessimistic (optimistic) 
bias when the level of Q-score is relatively high (low), or a positive association between analysts’ earnings forecasts 
errors (measured as the difference between actual earnings and forecasted earnings) and the level of Q-score. If so, it 
indicates that analysts fail to incorporate fully into their earnings forecasts the effect of interaction between 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on earnings quality. More formally, our alternative 
hypothesis proceeds as follows: 
 
H1: Analysts’ earnings forecasts errors are positively associated with the level of Q-score. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Measurement of Earnings Quality 
 
We adopt the Q-score constructed by Penman and Zhang (2002) as the index to measure the level of 
earnings quality, which incorporates the joint effects between accounting conservatism and changes in real 
investment on earnings quality. Following Penman and Zhang (2002), we regard earnings quality as low when Q-
score is either excessively high or excessively low. The Q-score consists of two subordinated measures, QA and QB. 
QA is derived from the change of estimated reserves (ER) relative to net operating assets (NOA) (hereafter, C-score), 
while QB is derived from the difference between firm-level C-score and its median within the firm’s industry. 
   𝑄! = !"!!"#! − !"!!!!"#!!!   (1) 
 𝑄! = !"!!"#! − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛( !"!!"#!) (2) 
 
Where: 
 
ERt = INVtres + RDtres + ADVtres  
NOAt = Operating Assetst - Operating Liabilitiest  
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The estimated reserves, ER, are calculated as the sum of three components:  
 
(1) INVtres: The Inventory Reserve (Invtres) Is The LIFO Reserve Reported In The Footnotes Of Financial 
Statements, Which Is The Difference Between The Costs Of Goods Sold Under LIFO And FIFO;  
(2) RDtres: The R&D reserve (RDtres) equals the estimated amortized R&D assets that would have been on the 
balance sheet if R&D had not been expensed. Amortized R&D assets are measured by the difference 
between five year weighted average of R&D expenditure of current year and five year weighted average of 
R&D expenditure of last year;  
(3) ADVtres:  The advertising reserve (ADVtres) is the estimated brand asset created by advertising expenditures. 
Brand asset is measured by the difference between two year weighted average of advertising cost of current 
year and two year weighted average of advertising cost of last year. 
 
Also, we calculate the net operating assets, NOAt, as the book value of operating assets minus the book 
value of operating liabilities in order to measure the net investment in operations. 
 
As noted by Penman and Zhang (2002), the joint effect of accounting conservatism and changes in real 
investment on current earnings can be measured by the change in estimated reserves relative to net operating assets. 
To examine the earnings quality, it is essential to focus on whether this effect is temporary or not. If a firm’s reserve 
increases due to growing investments and it continues to grow in the future, then the joint effect of accounting 
conservatism and changes in real investment on current earnings might not be temporary. QA is defined as the 
change in estimated reserves relative to net operating assets, implying that this score is determined by the growth 
rate in the estimated reserves relative to the growth rate in net operating assets. If estimated reserves increase at a 
higher (lower) rate than net operating assets, the score is greater (less) than 0. Thus, by positing that the growth in 
the estimated reserve is temporary when it differs from the growth in net operating assets, we can measure the 
earnings quality by QA measure.  
 
We also measure the earnings quality by QB by positing that the portion of a firm’s estimated reserves 
relative to net operating assets that differs from the industry median is likely to be temporary. For instance, 
relatively higher C-score of a firm will subsequently reverts toward the industry median, resulting that the portion of 
firm’s estimated reserves will flow into future earnings. Since it is ambiguous which benchmark, i.e., the firm’s 
prior-period C-score or the current-period industry median, might be the best one to identify temporary effects on 
earnings, we weight the two measures equally as in Penman and Zhang (2002):  
 
Q=(0.5xQA)+(0.5xQB) (3) 
 
It should be noticed that both high (positive) and low (negative) Q-scores can reveal that current earnings 
are subject to poor quality, while a Q-score of zero reveals good quality. Specifically, as demonstrated by Penman 
and Zhang (2002), a relatively high (low) Q-score exhibits that current earnings are temporarily depressed (inflated) 
and therefore resulting in higher (lower) earnings in the future. This clearly suggests that both high and low Q-scores 
identify the poor quality of current earnings.  
 
3.2 Regression Equation 
 
We construct a regression equation to examine the association between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors 
and Q-scores, while adding control variables previously identified as determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors. The regression equation is as follows: 
  
FERRt+1 = α0 + α1Qt + α2ACCt + α3GRLTNOAt + α4EARNSURPt  
         +α5MOMENTUMt + α6BETAt + α7ln(SIZE)t + α8OIVOLt + εt  (4) 
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Where: 
 
FERRt+1 = One-Year-Ahead Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Errors, Measured By One-Year-Ahead Actual Earnings 
Per Share Minus One-Year-Ahead Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Per Share (Median Consensus) Scaled By Stock 
Price; 
 
Qt = Q-Score As Described In Section 3.1; 
 
Acct = Accruals, Measured By [Δ Current Asset – Δ Current Liability – Δ Cash + Δ Short Term Debt + Δ Income 
Taxes Payable – Depreciation Expense], Scaled By Average Total Assets; 
 
Grltnoat = The Growth Rates In Long Term Net Operating Assets, Scaled By Average Total Assets; 
Earnsurpt = The Standardized Unexpected Quarterly Earnings, Which Is Equal To The Current Fourth Quarter’s 
Actual Earnings Minus The Previous Fourth Quarter’s Actual Earnings Divided By The Standard Deviation Of The 
Unexpected Quarterly Earnings Over The Previous Seven Quarters;  
 
Momentumt = The Stock Returns During The Prior Twelve Months; 
 
Betat = The Systematic Risks Estimated By Regressing At Least Thirty But Up To Sixty Prior Monthly Stock 
Returns Against The Corresponding Market Returns; 
 
Ln(Size)T = The Natural Logarithm Of Total Assets; And 
 
Oivolt = The Standard Deviation Of Operating Income Before Depreciation For Last Five Years, Scaled By Average 
total assets.  
 
First, one-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecast errors (FERR) are calculated as the difference between 
one-year-ahead actual earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts (median consensus) scaled by current stock price. If 
analysts do not fully incorporate the quality of current earnings affected by the joint effect of accounting 
conservatism and changes in real investment on subsequent year’s earnings, the association between current year’s 
Q-scores and subsequent year’s analysts’ forecast errors should be positive. This is because currently higher (lower) 
Q-score indicates higher (lower) future earnings. So, we expect α1 to be significantly positive. 
 
Second, we control for various factors that may affect analysts’ earnings forecast errors. First, a number of 
prior studies present that analysts’ earnings forecasts are biased when they fail to fully incorporate the accounting 
information into their earnings forecasts. Specifically, analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistically biased either 
when accruals are relatively high (Bradshaw et al. 2001) or when growth in long-term net operating assets is 
relatively high (Choi et al. 2008). In addition, analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to be low in case of positive earnings 
surprises (Abarbanell 1991) and higher stock price momentum (Mendenhall 1991). Thus, to control these effects, we 
include accruals (ACC), the growth in long-term net operating assets (GRLTNOA), quarterly earnings surprises 
(EARNSURP), and past stock returns (MOMENTUM)2 as the control variables. 
 
Third, we add several additional control variables, which are related with the general information 
environments. The extant research documents that analysts issue more optimistically biased earnings forecasts for 
firms with greater informational uncertainty (Das et al. 1998; Lim 2001). Thus, we control for firm size (ln(SIZE)) 
and historical earnings volatility (OIVOL), which represent commonly identified measures of firm-specific 
informational uncertainty. We also control for market beta (BETA) which represents systematic risk based on 
Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM). The magnitude of informational uncertainty is likely to be lower for larger 
firms while it is likely to be higher for firms with greater volatility of historical earnings and higher market beta.  
 
 
 
                                                
2 Our results do not change even when we do not control for MOMENTUM. 
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3.3 Sample 
 
 We collect the data from three sources. First, financial statements data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
annual and quarterly database. Second, we obtain the data on stock returns from the CRSP daily stock returns files. 
Third, analysts’ earnings forecasts data are obtained from the I/B/E/S summary statistics file. We cover NYSE and 
AMEX non-financial firms whose fiscal years end in December. We exclude observations when there are missing 
variables, which are necessary for our analysis, such as stock price, number of shares and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts etc. Our sample period begins in 1985 and ends in 2008. The main reason that we limit our sample period 
to post-1984 is that we could get only a few analysts’ earnings forecasts data prior to 1985. We truncate the highest 
1% and the lowest 1% of the samples based on main variables (Q-score, FERR, etc) to exclude outliers. The number 
of our final sample is 8,071.  
 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for main variables. Analysts’ earnings forecasts errors (FERR) 
show a negative mean (-0.013), indicating that sell-side analysts are optimistically biased on average. The mean of 
Q-score is around zero (0.018) as expected.3 Accruals (ACC) are on average negative(mean : -0.036), while the 
growth in long-term net operating assets (GRLTNOA), quarterly earnings surprises (EARNSURP), and past stock 
returns (MOMENTUM) are on average positive (0.100, 0.281, 0.163, respectively). The distributions of these 
variables as well as the other variables are generally consistent with prior literature.  
 
Table 1 presents the distributions of main variables used in this study. FERR is one-year-ahead analysts’ 
earnings forecasts errors, measured as one-year-ahead actual earnings per share minus analysts’ one-year-ahead 
median consensus forecasted earnings per share, scaled by stock price as of April. Q is the Q-score as described in 
Section 3.1. ACC is accruals, measured as [Δ current asset – Δ current liability – Δ cash + Δ short term debt + Δ 
income taxes payable – depreciation expense], scaled by average total assets. GRLTNOA is the growth rates in long 
term net operating assets, scaled by average total assets. EARNSURP is the standardized unexpected quarterly 
earnings, which is equal to the current fourth quarter’s actual earnings minus the previous fourth quarter’s actual 
earnings divided by the standard deviation of the unexpected quarterly earnings over the previous seven quarters. 
MOMENTUM is the stock returns during the prior twelve months. BETA is the systematic risks estimated by 
regressing at least thirty but up to sixty prior monthly stock returns against the corresponding market returns. 
ln(SIZE) is natural logarithm of total assets. OIVOL is the standard deviation of operating income before 
depreciation of last five years, scaled by average total assets. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% (Median) 75% 
FERR -0.013 0.039 -0.019 -0.004 0.003 
Q 0.018 0.056 -0.007 0.002 0.030 
ACC -0.036 0.065 -0.069 -0.039 -0.008 
GRLTNOA 0.100 0.134 0.035 0.076 0.132 
EARNSURP 0.281 3.104 -0.515 0.353 1.603 
MOMENTUM 0.163 0.445 -0.082 0.115 0.333 
BETA 1.007 0.531 0.669 0.971 1.276 
ln(SIZE) 7.342 1.689 6.149 7.268 8.412 
OIVOL 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.016 0.024 
 
  
                                                
3 The mean value of Q-score of our sample (0.018) exhibit a considerable difference from that of Penman and Zhang (2002)’s study (0.099). It 
may be due to the different sample periods between two studies and also the requirement of analysts’ earnings forecasts data in our study. Given 
that the main results of Penman and Zhang (2002) are observed in our sample, this difference on the means of Q-score may not affect any 
conclusion of our study. 
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Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between main variables. Analysts’ earnings 
forecasts errors have a positive correlation with Q-score while it is not significant. And most of variables in the 
regression equation (1) show the expected signs of correlations with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. The 
multicollinearity problem seems not to be so serious because the associations among independent variables stay at 
low level between -0.20 and 0.20. These uni-variate correlation results should be interpreted with caution because 
they do not control for differences in other firm characteristics. The multiple regression analysis discussed below 
controls for such differences. 
 
This table presents Pearson correlation (above diagonal) and Spearman correlation (below diagonal) 
between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors, Q score and other key variables. Please refer to the note of Table 1 for 
the definition of the variables.  
 
Table 2. Correlations Between Key Variables 
 FERR Q ACC GRLTNOA EARNSURP MOMENTUM BETA ln(SIZE) OIVOL FERR  0.014 -0.039* 0.012 0.069* 0.180* -0.094* 0.118* -0.046* Q 0.010  -0.120* -0.182* -0.007 -0.007 0.065* 0.003 0.095* ACC -0.071* -0.110*  0.073* 0.113* -0.005 0.060* -0.155* 0.019 GRLTNOA -0.052* -0.208* 0.044*  0.032* 0.012 -0.009 0.015 0.088* EARNSURP 0.090* -0.001 0.152* 0.049*  0.166* 0.013 -0.036* 0.054* MOMENTUM 0.198* -0.003 -0.019 0.005 0.254*  0.031* -0.054* 0.064* BETA -0.085* 0.034* 0.064* -0.013 0.028* -0.022*  -0.088* 0.175* ln(SIZE) 0.139* 0.023* -0.157* -0.015 -0.036* -0.012 -0.089*  -0.246* OIVOL -0.066* 0.049* 0.018 0.162* 0.094* 0.019 0.156* -0.256*  Note: * denotes the significance levels at five percent or less 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Replication of Penman and Zhang (2002) 
 
We begin by replicating the results of Penman and Zhang (2002) to examine whether their results still hold 
in our sample. Using Q-score, the index of current earnings quality, they show that Q-score has a positive relation 
with the next year’s core return on net operating assets (RNOA), even after controlling for current year’s core 
RNOA. This result indicates that future earnings will be high (low) with higher (lower) Q-score. They also 
demonstrate that investors do not fully incorporate this earnings quality into their earnings expectations.  
 
Table 3 presents our replication results. In Panel A, we test whether current year’s Q-score has a predictive 
power on one-year-ahead core RNOA (CRNOA). We conduct regressions of one-year-ahead core RNOA (CRNOA) 
on current year’s Q-scores controlling for current year’s core RNOA (CRNOA): 
  
CRNOAt+1 = α0 + α1 CRNOAt + α2 Qt + εt,           (5) 
 
Where: 
 
CRNOAt+1(or t) = Core return on net operating assets (RNOA), computed as [operating income after depreciation/ 
average net operating assets] at time t+1 (or t); and 
 
Qt = Q-score at time t (as described in Section 3.1). 
 
To remove the effects of the cross-sectional correlation in error terms inherent to panel data, we adopt the 
“Fama-MacBeth” approach (Fama and MacBeth 1973). This approach is applied to all subsequent regression 
analyses. However, note that the “Fama-MacBeth” approach assumes that there is no serial correlation in the 
coefficients of year-by-year regressions across time. Therefore, we calculate the alternative t-statistics by using an 
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adjustment for serial correlation provided by Kemsley and Nissim (2002)4. As we expect, the estimated coefficient 
on Q-score is 0.239, with a significant t-statistics of 4.66. This result is consistent with Penman and Zhang (2002), 
indicating that it is valid to use the Q-score as an earnings quality indicator in our study. 
 
Following Penman and Zhang (2002), we also re-examine whether investors price stocks as if they 
appreciate the different quality of current earnings implied by the Q-score. Specifically, we conduct regressions of 
one-year-ahead stock returns on current year’s Q-scores, controlling for frequently used risk proxies as in Penman 
and Zhang (2002):  
 
RETt+1 = α0 + α1Qt + α2BETAt + α3ln(MV)t + α4ln(B/M)t + α5ln(LEV)t + α6E(+)/Pt + α7(E/P dummy)t + εt,   (6) 
 
Where: 
 
RETt+1 = one-Year-Ahead Annual Stock Returns After Q-Scoring (The Year Begins Four Months After Fiscal Year-
End);  
 
Qt = Q-Score (As Described In Section 3.1); 
 
Betat = The Systematic Risks Estimated By Regressing At Least Thirty But Up To Sixty Prior Monthly Stock 
Returns Against The Corresponding Market Returns; 
 
Ln(MV)T = The Natural Logarithm Of Market Value Of Equity; 
 
Ln(B/M)T = The Natural Logarithm Of The Book Value Of Equity Divided By The Market Value Of Equity; 
Ln(LEV)T = The Natural Logarithm Of The Book Value Of Total Assets Divided By The Book Value Of Equity; 
 
E(+)/Pt = Earnings Per Share Before Extraordinary Items (Reported In I/B/E/S) Divided By Stock Price (Positive 
Earnings Only); And 
 
(E/P Dummy)T = Negative Earnings Dummy, 1 If Earnings Are Negative, 0 Otherwise. 
 
Panel A in Table 3 presents the results of cross-sectional year-by-year regression for one-year-ahead core 
RNOA on Q-score and current core RNOA. CRNOAt(t+1) is core return on net operating assets (RNOA), computed 
by [(operating income after depreciation) / average net operating assets] at year t (or t+1). Qt is the Q-score at year t 
as described in Section 3.1. Panel B presents the results of cross-sectional year-by-year regression for one-year-
ahead stock returns on Q-score and other control variables. RETt+1 is one-year-ahead annual stock returns after Q-
scoring (the year begins four months after fiscal year-end). Qt is Q-score at year t as described in Section 3.1. BETAt 
is the systematic risks estimated by regressing at least thirty but up to sixty prior monthly stock returns against the 
corresponding market returns at year t. ln(MV)t is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at year t. ln(BM)t is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at year t. ln(LEV)t is natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets divided by the book value of equity at year t. E(+)/Pt is earnings per share 
before extraordinary items (reported in I/B/E/S) divided by stock price, positive earnings only, at year t. (E/P 
dummy)t is negative earnings dummy, 1 if earnings in year t are negative, 0 otherwise. The coefficients presented in 
this table are the means of the annual regressions. The adj. t-stat is the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973) which is adjusted for autocorrelation as in Kemsley and Nissim (2002). *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
As shown in Panel B, the coefficient of Q-score is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.170, t-stats. = 2.11) 
after controlling for risk proxies. Therefore, our finding confirms Penman and Zhang’s (2002) result that investors 
do not fully incorporate the implication of Q-score on future earnings.  
 
                                                
4 Since we adopt Fama-MacBeth approach and Q-Score already incorporate the industry-fixed effect, we do not control for year- and industry-
fixed effects. 
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Table 3. Results Of Regression Tests Of The Ability Of Q-Scores To Predict  
One-Year-Ahead Core RNOA And Results Of Regression Of One-Year-Ahead Stock Returns On Q-Scores 
Panel A : Results Of Regression Tests Of The Ability Of Q-Scores To Predict One-Year-Ahead Core RNOA 
CRNOAt+1 =α0 + α1 CRNOAt + α2 Qt + εt 
Dep. Variable Intercept CRNOAt Qt 
CRNOAt+1 0.036*** 0.790*** 0.239*** 
(adj. t – stat) (6.45) (26.53) (4.66) 
 
Panel B: Results Of Regression Of One-Year-Ahead Stock Returns On Q-Scores 
RETt+1=α0 + α1 Qt + α2 BETAt + α3ln(MV)t + α4 ln(B/M)t + α5 ln(LEV)t + α6 E(+)/Pt + α7 (E/P dummy)t + εt  
 Intercept Qt BETAt ln(MV) t ln(B/M) t ln(LEV) t E(+)/Pt (E/P dummy)t RET t+1 0.162*** 0.170** -0.021 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.049 -0.001 
(adj. t – stat) (3.66) (2.11) (-1.30) (-0.28) (0.55) (-0.18) (0.49) (-0.05) 
 
4.2 Main Results  
 
In this section, we investigate whether analysts’ earnings forecasts fully reflect the information of current 
earnings quality indicated by the Q-score. If analysts fully incorporate the different quality of current earnings into 
their earnings forecasts, then their forecast errors should not be systematically associated with the current year’s Q-
score. If not, their forecast errors will be more positive (negative) for firms with higher (lower) Q-score. We first 
measure analysts’ earnings forecast errors for the subsequent year’s earnings as of April, when is one month after 
the announcement of the firm’s financial statements. Then, we trace analysts’ earnings forecast errors from April to 
January of following year to check the degree of effect that Q score has on the analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. 
We focus on the 10 months from April to January of following year and exclude the data of February and March of 
following year, because on February and March, a considerable number of I/B/E/S data of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are omitted.  
 
Table 4 provides the result of multivariate regression of analysts’ earnings forecast errors on Q-score. 
Regressions are performed for each of the 10 months between the April of the year of financial statement 
announcement and January of following year. 
 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional year-by-year regressions for analysts’ earnings forecasts 
errors on Q-score and other control variables. Please refer to the note of Table 1 for the definition of the variables 
except for the following. FERRm,t+1 is one-year-ahead forecasts errors at the end of month m. The coefficients 
presented in this table are the means of the annual regressions. The adj. t-stat is the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics (Fama 
and MacBeth 1973) which is adjusted for autocorrelation as in Kemsley and Nissim (2002). *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4. Multivariate Regressions of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Error on Q-Scores 
 
FERR m,t+1 =α0 + α1 Qt + α2 ACCt + α3 GRLTNOAt + α4 EARNSURPt + α5 MOMENTUMt 
+ α6 BETAt + α7 ln(SIZE) t + α8 OIVOLt + εt 
          
Month Intercept Q ACC GRLTNOA EARNSURP MOMENTUM BETA ln(SIZE) OIVOL 
April -0.024*** 0.021** -0.015 0.010** 0.0003** 0.025*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.058 
(adj. t - stat) (-5.65) (2.29) (-1.60) (2.08) (2.09) (3.25) (-2.72) (5.81) (-0.98) 
May -0.022*** 0.021*** -0.012 0.010*** 0.0003** 0.019*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.059 
(adj. t - stat) (-6.08) (2.71) (-1.54) (2.60) (2.29) (2.67) (-2.75) (6.20) (-1.25) 
June -0.022*** 0.020*** -0.010 0.008*** 0.0003** 0.016*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.046 
(adj. t - stat) (-6.62) (3.00) (-1.53) (2.61) (2.00) (2.76) (-2.81) (6.96) (-1.12) 
July -0.021*** 0.020*** -0.008 0.007** 0.0003** 0.013*** -0.004*** 0.002*** -0.036 
(adj. t - stat) (-6.24) (3.09) (-1.32) (2.40) (2.22) (2.63) (-2.61) (6.22) (-1.02) 
August -0.018*** 0.020*** -0.005 0.006** 0.0003** 0.008* -0.003** 0.001*** -0.038 
(adj. t - stat) (-5.39) (3.09) (-0.90) (2.43) (2.49) (1.75) (-2.54) (5.02) (-1.32) 
September -0.016*** 0.019*** -0.006 0.004* 0.0002** 0.006* -0.003** 0.001*** -0.025 
(adj. t - stat) (-5.67) (3.43) (-1.06) (1.77) (2.23) (1.66) (-2.32) (4.96) (-0.99) 
October -0.014*** 0.017*** -0.003 0.004 0.0002* 0.004 -0.003** 0.001*** -0.024 
(adj. t - stat) (-4.35) (3.16) (-0.67) (1.58) (1.91) (1.36) (-2.30) (3.89) (-1.15) 
November -0.012*** 0.017*** -0.001 0.002 0.0001 0.001 -0.002* 0.001*** -0.025 
(adj. t - stat) (-3.49) (2.88) (-0.22) (0.88) (1.04) (0.59) (-1.92) (2.93) (-1.32) 
December -0.010*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.000 -0.001* 0.001** -0.022 
(adj. t - stat) (-2.96) (2.72) (-0.43) (0.59) (0.58) (0.01) (-1.71) (2.37) (-1.42) 
January of 
following year -0.009
*** 0.016** -0.002 0.001 0.00004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001** -0.023 
(adj. t - stat) (-2.62) (2.55) (-0.29) (0.44) (0.34) (-0.58) (-1.11) (2.19) (-1.57) 
 
The estimated coefficient of Q-score is significantly positive (Coefficient = 0.021, t-stats. = 2.29) in April 
(the first month), demonstrating that analysts do not appreciate fully the varying quality of current earnings when 
they make their initial earnings forecasts. In other words, this result indicates that analysts initially underestimate 
(overestimate) one-year-ahead earnings when Q-score is relatively high (low). This association remains significant 
until it comes to January of following year, but the magnitude of coefficients declines from 0.021 to 0.016 as of 
January of following year (the last month) as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 presents the magnitude of regression coefficients of Q-Scores on analysts’ earnings forecasts 
errors across following months from April to January of following year (the last month). Vertical axis is the 
magnitude of regression coefficients of Q-score. Horizontal axis indicates months. 
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Figure 1. Regression Coefficients Of Q Scores On Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Errors Across Following Months 
 
We illustrate our result more graphically in Figure 2. Figure 2 depicts the movements of mean analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors for the one-year-ahead earnings as time goes. More specifically, the mean forecast errors are 
calculated for portfolios comprised of firm-years in the highest decile of Q-scores (High-Q group) and lowest decile 
of Q-scores (Low-Q group). The graphs of High-Q group and Low-Q group are depicted as dotted line and solid 
line, respectively. Also, Figure 2 plots the sample mean forecast errors (thick line) as a benchmark. These three lines 
are depicted over the 10 months (horizontal axis) following the announcement of financial statements. The left 
vertical axis lists the mean of analysts’ earnings forecast errors, defined as actual earnings less forecasted earnings, 
all scaled by the stock price at the end of April. In addition, the right vertical axis lists the difference of forecast 
errors between High-Q group and Low-Q group, and such differences over the 10 months are described by 
histograms. 
 
Figure 2 presents analysts’ earnings forecasts errors for the highest and the lowest deciles of portfolios 
based on Q-scores during the 10 months following financial statement announcement. We defined the highest 10% 
Q-score portfolios as High-Q group and the lowest 10% Q-score portfolios as Low-Q group. Dotted line indicates 
High-Q group. Solid line indicates Low-Q group. Thick line indicates the sample mean forecast errors. Histogram is 
the difference of forecast errors between High-Q group and Low-Q group. Horizontal axis is months. Left vertical 
axis is the forecast errors, defined as actual earnings less forecasted earnings all scaled by the stock price at the end 
of April. Right vertical axis is the difference of forecast errors between High-Q group and Low-Q group. 
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Figure 2. Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Errors For Highest And Lowest Deciles  
Of Portfolios Based On Q-Scores During The 10 Months Following Financial Statement Announcement 
 
As depicted by Figure 2, analysts’ earnings forecast errors for the High-Q group are consistently higher 
than the sample average at all points of time, while the forecast errors of Low-Q group are consistently lower. In 
addition, as depicted by the histograms, the extent of the differences between High-Q and Low-Q group is the 
largest in the first month, and gradually decreases as the month progresses. This pattern, consistent with our 
expectation, implies that analysts do not initially appreciate the future earnings implications of the quality of current 
earnings indicated by the Q-score. However, analysts increasingly realize the implications of current earnings 
quality for subsequent year earnings as the month progresses. This may arise from the gradual release of additional 
earnings-relevant information that is available from subsequent quarterly earnings announcements.  
 
Taken together, our results indicate that analysts do not incorporate fully the joint effect of accounting 
conservatism and changes in real investment on the quality of current earnings but they gradually correct their 
forecast errors during the subsequent months, as the future earnings become more predictable due to additional 
earnings-relevant information. 
 
4.3 Additional Tests 
 
There may be a concern that Q-score and accruals may capture a similar aspect of earnings quality related 
with the growth of real investment. That is, it might be possible that our main results were driven by the well-known 
accrual anomaly which was subsumed by Q-score in our sample. However, we believe that accruals anomaly (Sloan 
1996) and investors’ mispricing of earnings quality captured by Q-score (Penman and Zhang 2002) are 
discriminated as follows.  
 
While accruals capture a piece of information about overall fundamental investment (Zhang 2007), Q-score 
represents the effect of temporary change of real investment under continuous application of accounting 
conservatism on earnings quality (Penman and Zhang 2002). For example, Fairfield et al. (2001) interpret accruals 
as the growth in short-term net operating assets and show that investors overreact to accruals as well as the growth 
of long-term net operating assets. Although this effect may be partially attributed to accounting conservatism (i.e., 
new investment, rapid depreciation, and decreased subsequent earnings), the accrual anomaly may be interpreted 
mainly as investors’ overreaction to overall growth of investment. However, Penman and Zhang (2002) build up Q-
0
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score to capture the effect of a temporary change of “hidden reserve”, which is largely affected by conservative 
accounting, relative to the growth of net operating assets on earnings quality. That is, Q-score captures the 
temporary growth of “hidden reserve” after controlling for the overall growth of investment. Thus, while accruals 
capture a piece of information regarding the overall fundamental investment, Q-score focuses on a part of 
investment, which is treated as expenses under conservative accounting, relative to the overall growth of investment. 
Based on this reasoning, Penman and Zhang (2002) also argue that Q-score provides incremental information 
beyond accruals on the effect of growth of real investment on earnings quality.  
 
To address this concern, however, we re-conduct the regression analysis by including either only Q-score 
or accruals to isolate the effect of each variable on analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. Untabulated results indicate 
that, when only accruals are included in the regression, the majority of their coefficients are statistically insignificant 
except the coefficients during the first three months. Furthermore, when only Q-score is included in the regression, 
the coefficients of Q-score are all significant from April up to January of following year. In addition, we examine 
the variations of analysts’ earnings forecasts errors across portfolios based on either Q-score or level of accruals. 
Untabulated results show that the differences between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors of the highest and lowest 
Q-score portfolios are all statistically significant from April to January of following year, while they are all 
insignificant for the portfolios based on the level of accruals. Lastly, we rerun the regression equation (6) to identify 
which of Q-score or accruals dominates the other one in predicting future stock returns. Untabulated results indicate 
that the independent effect of Q-score on future stock returns is still significant after controlling for accruals.  
 
Taken together, these additional analyses suggest that our main results are not driven by the accrual 
anomaly which might be subsumed by the Q-score in our sample. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines whether sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts fully incorporate the joint effect of 
accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on future earnings when they forecast future earnings. More 
specifically, we examine the association between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and the index (i.e. Q-score) of 
earnings quality. We find a significant association between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors and the index of 
earnings quality. This result indicates that sell-side analysts do not fully incorporate the quality of current earnings 
affected by the joint effect of accounting conservatism and changes in real investment on future earnings when they 
forecast future earnings. This result implies that investors cannot fully incorporate such information simply by using 
analysts’ earnings forecasts as their benchmark for earnings expectations. This study contributes to the growing 
body of evidence relating to the efficiency of analysts’ earnings forecast. In addition, our study may promote 
investors’ assessment of the usefulness or limitation of analysts’ earnings forecasts when they make their earnings 
expectations.  
 
Notwithstanding a clear contribution of our study, our findings should be interpreted with the following 
caveats. First, since our analyses require the data of analysts’ earnings forecasts, our sample may be biased toward 
some types of firms, such as large firms. Accordingly, we admit that our results would not necessarily be 
generalized to a broader set of firms. We believe, however, that there is no ex-ante expectation that this potential 
sample selection bias due to the data availability drives our main results. Second, individual firms may have unique 
firm-specific factors, which affect the analysts’ earnings forecasts errors but are not captured by our control 
variables. Thus, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that our main empirical results may be driven by omitted 
variables that we have not controlled for. Lastly, in this study, we examine only the average bias of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in incorporating the effects of interaction between accounting conservatism and changes in real 
investment on the quality of current earnings. However, future research needs to examine the determinants of the 
cross-sectional variation of association between analysts’ earnings forecasts errors and Q-score, such as information 
environments, to fully understand the systematic bias of analysts’ earnings forecasts in incorporating such an effect. 
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